Is there any easy way to determine the ATT&CK version I'm using?

MITRE are releasing 1/2 new versions of ATT&CK each year, which is great!

https://attack.mitre.org/resources/versions/

Generally in an update the following things happen:

  • objects deprecated
  • new objects are added
  • existing objects are updated, either
    • minor changes (STIX ID remains the same), or
    • major changes (STIX ID changes).

Which left me thinking, how do I know what version of ATT&CK am I using? It might be I’m on an old version but would only really be able to tell by looking for new objects in newer versions that don’t exist in my version. That’s very inefficient. Is there a better way to do this?

tl;dr, no.

Let me try an explain.

Firstly, I want to make it clear the property x_mitre_version has absolutely nothing to do with ATT&CK version. See below it is 1.0.

{
    "type": "bundle",
    "id": "bundle--d9aa2304-fd4d-4a9b-989f-cf576534e5f1",
    "spec_version": "2.0",
    "objects": [
        {
            "x_mitre_platforms": [
                "Windows"
            ],
            "x_mitre_domains": [
                "enterprise-attack"
            ],
            "object_marking_refs": [
                "marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
            ],
            "id": "attack-pattern--0042a9f5-f053-4769-b3ef-9ad018dfa298",
            "type": "attack-pattern",
            "created": "2020-01-14T17:18:32.126Z",
            "created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
            "external_references": [
                {
                    "source_name": "mitre-attack",
                    "external_id": "T1055.011",
                    "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/011"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx",
                    "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "Microsoft Window Classes"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx",
                    "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "Microsoft GetWindowLong function"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx",
                    "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "Microsoft SetWindowLong function"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process",
                    "description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "Elastic Process Injection July 2017"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html",
                    "description": "MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection \u2013 Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/",
                    "description": "Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013"
                },
                {
                    "url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx",
                    "description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
                    "source_name": "Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function"
                }
            ],
            "modified": "2020-11-10T18:29:31.004Z",
            "name": "Extra Window Memory Injection",
            "description": "Adversaries may inject malicious code into process via Extra Window Memory (EWM) in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. EWM injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. \n\nBefore creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data).(Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of EWM to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process\u2019s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process\u2019s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as <code>WriteProcessMemory</code> and <code>CreateRemoteThread</code>.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process.  (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nRunning code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via EWM injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process. ",
            "kill_chain_phases": [
                {
                    "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
                    "phase_name": "defense-evasion"
                },
                {
                    "kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
                    "phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
                }
            ],
            "x_mitre_detection": "Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017)",
            "x_mitre_is_subtechnique": true,
            "x_mitre_version": "1.0",
            "x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
            "x_mitre_data_sources": [
                "Process: OS API Execution"
            ],
            "x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [
                "Anti-virus",
                "Application control"
            ]
        }
    ]
}

x_mitre_version is defined as;

The version of the object in format major.minor where major and minor are integers. ATT&CK increments this version number when the object content is updated.

Source; cti/USAGE.md at master · mitre/cti · GitHub

Which is still confusing!

In short, this property changes if the content of the object changes between MITRE ATT&CK versions, but it is not linked to the actual ATT&CK version itself.

Easy way to determine version if you manage the objects

  1. If you’re managing the objects yourself you can use Github release tags (from the mitre/cti repo);

See each release has a tag. You can select the tag and then download the bundle stored under the tag commit.

e.g. this link will give you the MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise objects for v12.0: cti/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack.json at ATT&CK-v12.0 · mitre/cti · GitHub

  1. If you’re managing the objects yourself from the mitre-attack/attack-stix-data repo, you can user the bundle names

e.g. attack-stix-data/enterprise-attack/enterprise-attack-14.1.json at master · mitre-attack/attack-stix-data · GitHub is Enterprise ATT&CK 14.1

In either case (1 or 2) when you ingest these into a database you can then add an additional property to set the version. As you add new versions to the database, you can use the same property with a new version. You can then simply ask the DB to give you a specified ATT&CK version.

A good example of this is shown in stix2arango: https://github.com/signalscorps/stix2arango

Here you can set a stix2arango_note on import of the STIX bundle. In this example it could be used for the ATT&CK version.

How to determine version if you don’t manage the objects

I imagine this is the situation you’re in.

This is almost impossible, unless you use the trial and error approach.

Generally the best way to do this is to find the IDs of the new objects and see if they’re in your version. e.g. T1548.005 was new in v14. If you don’t have this then you know you’re not on the latest version.

Of course this only tells you that you’re not on the latest version, and not the actual version. The only real way to determine the version in this scenario is by checking with the person/tool managing the ATT&CK objects to tell you.

You will also find this post on the subject useful…